certain that a minute factor in the process should foresee the perhaps infinitely remote end of the universal Evolution. It is not shown why Man and the perfection of Man should be the supreme goal of the Cosmic process: it appears more compatible with such a line of thought to conceive, as Huxley did, that Man is a fleeting product in the millennial Cosmic process. If so, why should not Religion and Morality be rather human delusions by means of which Evolution serves purposes of its own which lie beyond the ken of the human spirit? Professor Fiske depends on what is for him a foregone conclusion. Again, he assumes a quasi-human, absolute God, a God immanent in the Universe: but what is the relation of this God to Evolution? How is God, further, at once immanent in and externally related to, the human spirits which are evolved by more perfect adjustments to God? And it may be asked whether the good in God is absolute or relative to Evil: if the former, the impossibility of a positive Good is given up: if the latter, God is not perfect. And as regards human good, it appears paradoxical that Evolution should proceed by eliminating an essential factor and thus tend to non-entity; or it is paradoxical that if good and evil are essential to each other, an infinitely small portion of the one should serve to make possible an infinitely great portion of the other.

These and similar difficulties seem latent in Professor Fiske's pleasant and confident reasonings.

R. A. WRIGHT.

LONDON.

HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. By Dr. W. Windelband, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Strassburg. Authorized translation by Herbert Ernest Cushman, Ph. D., Instructor in Philosophy in Tufts' College. From the second German edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Pp. xv., 393.

An eminent psychologist who had received his training at the very source of modern experimental laboratory psychology, and who was himself in charge of one of the most important psychological laboratories in the world, once expressed his bitter disappointment that so often the labor in the laboratories was expended in employing psychology as an aid in the study of physiological problems. Or, if these pioneers in the new pyschology did perchance remember that they were in their laboratories first of all for

the purpose of studying psychology, their time was spent in trivial things. For his own part, this investigator would always remember that he was a psychologist, and that he was in search of light on the large and comprehensive psychological questions. He has lived up to his claim; but he has paid the penalty. He is reproached by the "up-to-date" workers in his field with being an old-school metaphysical psychologist in disguise, one who gives merely "subjective" theories the veneer of scientific fact in his laboratory. There are obviously dangers on both sides. But I think my psychologist friend is on the safer and saner side, and that, in his work, he is vindicating his claim.

The situation as regards the history of philosophy is quite similar to the one outlined above with regard to the "new psychology." Long ago haphazard histories of philosophy which gathered their facts indiscriminately, and enlivened the tale, where it had life at all, with scraps of learned gossip, have been cast aside, or have been sent to keep company with Diogenes' curious scrapbook. For Hegel appeared and taught the real and present value of historical studies. History is interesting because it is the story of man "writ large," because in it we discover the self-revelation of the free spirit. The history of philosophy is valuable because it is philosophy itself "writ large." Truth is many-sided, and if all philosophies are false because "our little systems have their day," in another and a deeper sense all philosophies are true, because our little systems do not "cease to be." And that philosophy is the truest which most truly appreciates all other philosophies, and most completely systematizes all other systems. Since Hegel's day the desire of the intellectual revolutionist to ignore the past, to turn his back on philosophical "learning's many palaces," and strike out afresh, seeking perhaps new light in strange and out of the way places (consulting mediums and the like), or simply seeking it in the patient and minute study of experiences that lie near at hand, has sent its unfortunate possessor on a vain quest. If successful at all, he ends by bringing back as a new discovery merely some old and well-worn formula. Mastery of the past is necessary before one can with any well-grounded hope face the future. The Hegelian view was captivating. It found at once many devotees. But it has its dangerous side. Hegel, as indeed every philosopher must, undertook to be the *arbiter philosophorum.* Only, Hegel was so exasperatingly sure of his wisdom and of his right to play the Lord's anointed; and the narrative which was to

illustrate and reveal the truth in its triumphant forward march of self-evolution was, in some cases at least, so obviously twisted to fit some preärranged formula according to which it should develop. In our own day, this method shared the general disfavor into which Hegelianism, and indeed metaphysics generally, fell, and we have been treated in recent years to works and monographs without end, written from the so-called "objective," "scientific" standpoint. If in the former case it was sought to explain the genesis of philosophy from its inner significance, in the latter it will rather be from its external conditions. In both cases are there dangers; in both cases have good results been accomplished. There are few historians of philosophy, however, who are at once able and willing to hold together these two points of view. This is precisely that which constitutes the great value of Professor Windelband's researches in the history of philosophy. "Hegel created the science of the history of philosophy according to its ideal purposes, but not until after his day was safe ground presented for achieving such a science by the philological method of getting the data without presuppositions" (p. 7). And so Professor Windelband would, on the one hand, portray the philosophical doctrines with "philological exactness," observing all "the precautionary measures of the historical method;" and, on the other hand, fix definitely "the value of each individual philosophic doctrine in the development of the scientific consciousness." He would be the chronicler of philosophers' opinions, and, at the same time, the constructive philosophical thinker.

The peculiar difficulties the historian encounters in treating of Pythagorean philosophy, Professor Windelband, following a modern fashion, avoids by rigidly separating the "practice" of Pythagoras from the "science" of the Pythagoreans. Pythagoras was a reactionary in the practical world, desiring a return to the old institutions and convictions, and, at the same time, endeavoring to purify the religious ideas of his countrymen. The Pythagoreans became philosophers and developed the "number theory." This is a convenient way of disposing of the difficulty, and the development of philosophical concepts becomes perhaps a little simplified if we can regard the number theory as an attempt to mediate in the conflict between the Eleatics and Heraclitus, as Professor Windelband does. But we fear this is one of those "subjective" pitfalls the Hegelian method of concepts exposes one to (*Pace* Burnet!). The plain fact is that it is just the treacherous Alexandrine

sources that make Pythagoras preëminently, and almost exclusively, a religious teacher and miracle monger. And, as Professor Windelband has himself shown (pp. 350 ff. and 343) in Alexandria at that time the philosophies were being made over into religions. And it is a clear misrepresentation of the case to say: "Neither Plato nor Aristotle knew anything about a philosophy of Pythagoras, but simply made mention of a philosophy of the 'so-called Pythagoreans.' Nowhere is the 'number theory' referred to the 'Master' himself" (p. 29). That Aristotle did believe Pythagoras had a philosophy, and the reason why he does not distinguish that philosophy from the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, is evident enough from a careful analysis of the passage in Book I, ch. v. of the "Metaphysics," where Aristotle, after referring to the number theory and to the special theories of one branch of the school adds, that Alcmæon of Croton apparently had a similar view; and that this similarity could be explained either from his having borrowed the theory from the Pythagoreans or they from him, "for Alcmæon had reached the age of manhood in the latter years of Pythagoras." The truth is, much yet remains to be done before we can be certain precisely what Pythagoras stood for, and the investigations of modern scholarship are far from final.

Among the specially attractive features of the book we might mention the exceedingly interesting and suggestive sketch of the intellectual life in Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C., which serves as an introduction to the study of the philosophy; the unusually complete treatment of the philosophy of Democritus; and the relatively full account of Alexandrine philosophy,—of the meeting of Greek and Jewish and Christian elements and the consequent philosophizing of religion and religionizing of philosophy.

Professor Windelband's book is at once the most complete, the most scholarly, the most philosophical and the most readable handbook of ancient philosophy in existence, and those familiar with it in the original have long wished that it might be made available for use in their classes. They owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Cushman for having at last done it into English. The difficult task of the translator has been faithfully performed. Occasionally, we think, Dr. Cushman has been too literally faithful to the text, so that one is reminded that it *is* a translation.

Charles M. Bakewell.

Bryn Mawr.